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The Enforceability Gap of Covenants Not to
Compete in Telecommuting Employment
Relationships
Emily J. Kuot
This Comment addresses the poor fit between existing doc-
trine on the enforceability of noncompete covenants and the
recent emergence of telecommuting employment relationships in
nationwide and worldwide markets. It argues that current judi-
cial enforcement rules produce unfair and incoherent outcomes in
the context of these global employment relationships. The Com-
ment then proposes that legislatures rather than courts should
make the policy judgment involved in crafting a new rule because
legislatures have greater political accountability and superior
access to empirical data.
Part I of this Comment explains both the purpose of and
limits on covenants not to compete. It also shows the implications
the communications explosion and the rise in telecommuting
present for covenants not to compete. Part II presents the tradi-
tional enforcement rule for covenants not to compete-the 'rule of
reason.' Part II.A shows that courts have sometimes ignored the
rule of reason's requirement of a reasonable geographic limit
when construing noncompete covenants that cover nationwide or
worldwide markets. Part II.B presents the types of statutes that
govern covenants not to compete and their variations on the rule
of reason. Part III argues that the decisions in cases involving
nationwide or worldwide markets fail to create a fair and coher-
ent standard for telecommuting relationships in such markets
because they rely on inadequate substitutes for the protection of
the geographical limit. Part IV recommends legislative and
judicial responses to this enforcement gap. Part IV.A argues that
legislatures, and not courts, should make the policy decision
involved in crafting a new rule for telecommuting relationships
in nationwide or worldwide markets. Part LV.B then proposes an
interim default rule for courts.
t B.S. 1994, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. Candidate 1997,
University of Chicago.
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I. THE USE OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Covenants not to compete are restraints on trade which
courts will sometimes enforce in the employment context.1 The
recent and expected future growth of telecommuting employment
relationships2 challenges the assumptions underlying existing
doctrine on the enforcement of covenants not to compete.
A. The Purpose and Limitations of Covenants Not to Compete
In an employment relationship, a covenant not to compete is
an employee's contractual promise to refrain from engaging in
business similar to that of her employer or from working for a
competitor of her employer.3 Employers ask employees to sign
noncompete agreements to protect business interests such as
trade secrets, customer lists, and investments like training in
unique skills.4 Covenants not to compete are enforceable only if
reasonable because they are contracts in restraint of trade, which
the law generally disfavors.5
In determining the reasonableness of covenants not to com-
pete, most jurisdictions still apply some variant of the rule of
reason,6 a three-part balancing test that examines: (1) whether
the restriction is broader than necessary to protect a legitimate
employer interest;7 (2) whether the restriction imposes undue
hardship on the employee;8 and (3) whether the restriction is
See notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
2 See notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
See Fla Stat Ann § 542.33(2)(a) (West 1988 & Supp 1996).
See Apollo Technologies Corp. v Centrosphere Industry Corp., 805 F Supp 1157,
1192-93 (D NJ 1992) (noting that protectable interests include trade secrets, customer
lists, and special harm from the unique nature of the employee's services); Picker Intl.,
Inc. v Parten, 935 F2d 257, 262 (11th Cir 1991) (noting that protectable interests include
trade secrets, client relationships, and extensive training); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v
Altech, Inc., 765 F Supp 1310, 1336 (N D Ill 1990) (noting that protectable interests in-
clude the employer's investment in training, trade secrets, confidential information, and
customer relationships). See also James H.A. Pooley, Restrictive Employee Covenants in
California, 4 Computer & High Tech L J 251, 251 (1988) (noting employers' concern about
competition from former employees for current staff members and customers).
5 See American Hot Rod Association v Carrier, 500 F2d 1269, 1277 (4th Cir 1974)
(noting that North Carolina follows trend of modern authority and scrutinizes noncompete
covenants as partial restraints of trade); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1979);
Ala Code § 8-1-1 (1993); Phillip J. Closius and Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary
Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Com-
pete-A Proposal for Reform, 57 S Cal L Rev 531, 539-40 (1984) (noting near-unanimous
judicial acknowledgement of the covenant's disfavored status as a restraint of trade).
6 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 comment a (1979).
7 Id § 188(1)(a).
' Id § 188(1)(b).
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injurious to public interests.9 A covenant must also be reason-
able as to duration, geographical area, and type of activity in
order to satisfy all three prongs."0 Courts generally enforce only
those covenants which limit the prohibition on competition to
places in which the employee actually performed services for the
employer."
B. The Effect of the Communications. Explosion and
Telecommuting on Covenants Not to Compete
The Department of Commerce recently declared, "[y]ou could
live in many places without foregoing opportunities for useful
and fulfilling employment, by 'telecommuting' to your office
through an electronic highway instead of by automobile, bus or
train."2 The number of Americans who telecommute during part
or all of their workweeks, currently somewhere between 2 million
and 7.6 million, will rise to as high as 15 million by 2003, accord-
ing to one estimate. 13
In addition to the explosion of communications technology,
multifarious concerns about the environment, the family unit,
personal autonomy, and overhead costs are fueling the movement
toward telecommuting. 4 Some employees who do not work at
9 Id.
'0 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 comment d.
" See America Software USA, Inc. v Moore, 264 Ga 480, 481-82, 448 SE2d 206 (1994)
(citing W.R, Grace & Co. v Mouyal, 262 Ga 464, 466-67, 422 SE2d 529 (1992) for the
proposition that a restriction on the area where the employee did business for the employ-
er is a legitimate protection); Diversified Human Resources Group, Inc. v Levinson-
Polakoff, 752 SW2d 8, 12 (Tex App 1988) (noting that territory in which employee used to
work is generally a reasonable area); Chuck Wagon Catering, Inc. v Raduege, 88 Wis 2d
740, 754, 277 NW2d 787 (1979) (noting that covenants are reasonable if limited to route
or customers former employee actually served); Zep Manufacturing Co. v Harthcock, 824
SW2d 654, 660 (Tex App 1992) (recognizing that a reasonable area is generally the terri-
tory where the former employee worked); Donahue v Permacel Tape Corp., 234 Ind 398,
406-07, 127 NE2d 235 (1955) (approving position that covenants restricting employee
beyond area of former employment are void even if employer's business covers greater
area); Crowe v Manpower Temporary Serv., 256 Ga 239, 240, 347 SE2d 560 (1986) (noting
authority that generally territorial restrictions relating to employee's business locale are
enforceable, while those relating to employer's are not enforceable).
2 National Telecommunications and Information Administration, The National
Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed Reg 49025, 49026 (1993).
" Stephen C. Fehr, Moving the Job Closer to the Commuter; GSA Experimenting with
Computer-Equipped Satellite Offices, Wash Post B1, B3 (Sept 26, 1993). In 1990, 25
million telecommuting and self-employed Americans worked at home, and by 1993, the
number had increased to 32 million. Alice Bredin, Home, Sweet Home, Newsday 31, 32
(Sept 13, 1993).
" See 58 Fed Reg at 49026 (citing reduction in paperwork and increase in accessibili-
ty of information, schools, medical care, and cultural opportunities without regard to
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home are participating in programs like the federal government's
Flexible Workplace Project ("Flexiplace"), which provides
multiagency office space in outlying areas from which employees
can telecommute to their respective agencies."1 California and
New York have even required some of their state agencies to de-
velop telecommuting programs."
Simultaneous with the telecommuting trend is the expansion
of American businesses of all sizes into nationwide and world-
wide markets. Like the growth in telecommuting, this broadening
of markets is attributable in part to improvements in the infor-
mation infrastructure.
17
As both broader markets and telecommuting employment
relationships continue to become more prevalent, courts applying
legal rules that rely upon features unique to the traditional em-
ployment relationship in a local market will face fact patterns of
geography as examples of the Administration's goals). See also Fehr, Wash Post at B1
(describing "family friendly" satellite work centers that allow employees to return home
earlier); Mike Causey, Going to Work at Home, Wash Post B2 (Feb 7, 1993) (citing reduc-
tion in office overhead and subsidized parking as goals of the Federal Flexible Workplace
Project).
" Fehr, Wash Post at 1; Causey, Wash Post at B2 (cited in note 14).
16 Bredin, Newsday at 32. For example, the California statute defines
"telecommuting" as "the partial or total substitution of computers or telecommunication
technologies, or both, for the commute to work by employees residing in California," Cal
Govt Code § 14200 (West 1992 & Supp 1996), and expresses California's recognition of the
growing importance of telecommuting:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares the following:
(1) Telecommuting can be an important means to reduce air pollution and traffic
congestion and to reduce the high costs of highway commuting.
(2) Telecommuting stimulates employee productivity while giving workers more
flexibility and control over their lives.
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage state agencies to adopt pol-
icies that encourage telecommuting by state employees.
Cal Govt Code § 14200.1 (West 1992 & Supp 1996). After acknowledging the significance
of telecommuting, the statute then contributes to its growth by requiring the following:
Every state agency shall review its work operations to determine where in its
organization telecommuting can be of practical benefit to the agency. On or
before July 1, 1995, each agency shall develop and implement a telecommuting
plan as part of its telecommuting program in work areas where telecommuting
is identified as being both practical and beneficial to the organization.
Cal Govt Code § 14201 (West 1992 & Supp 1996).
"1 See 58 Fed Reg at 49025, 49026 (cited in note 12) (predicting that "[a]n advanced
information infrastructure will enable U.S. firms to compete and win in the global econo-
my" and that even "[s]mall manufacturers could get orders from all over the world elec-
tronically").
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first impression. One challenge courts will face is the decreasing
relevance of geographic location in contracts governing
telecommuting relationships in nationwide and worldwide mar-
kets.18 The popular covenant not to compete19 is one type of
contract that will present courts with this problem because courts
have been using geographic location to balance employee and
employer interests in enforcement decisions.2 °
II. DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
The common law balances employee, employer, and public
interests through the requirement of a reasonable geographic
limit on the enforceability of noncompete covenants. 1 Most stat-
utes that regulate covenants not to compete incorporate the com-
mon-law test.2 Courts have modified the doctrine to accommo-
date national and international markets where a geographic limit
has no meaning. They have done so by substituting activity-based
and customer-based limits for the geographic limit. A handful of
legislatures have also altered the common-law test by placing
nondiscretionary limits on covenants not to compete.
18 See Victoria A. Cundiff, Maximum Security: How to Prevent Departing Employees
from Putting Your Trade Secrets to Work for Your Competitors, 8 Santa Clara Computer &
High Tech L J 301, 317 (1992) (noting gratuitousness of geographic restrictions on
noncompete covenants in markets with few competitors who all compete nationally or
internationally).
" Closius & Schaffer, 57 S Cal L Rev at 532 (cited in note 5) (noting the rise of
technically skilled employees and service-oriented businesses and the resultant popularity
of noncompete covenants).
20 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 comment d (1979); America Software
USA, Inc., 264 Ga at 481-82 (noting that determining the reasonableness of a covenant's
geographic terms is relevant to the covenant's enforceability; Ackerman v Kimball Intl.,
Inc., 652 NE2d 507, 510 (Ind 1995) (noting that enforceability of covenants turns on rea-
sonableness of covenants' time, space, and activity limits); Diversified Human Resources
Group, Inc., 752 SW2d at 12 (holding covenant unenforceable in part because geographic
limit was unreasonably restrictive of former employee's employment opportunities); Zep
Manufacturing Co., 824 SW2d at 660-61 (holding covenant unenforceable in part because
geographic limit was unreasonably broad); Donahue, 234 Ind at 406-07 (holding covenant
unenforceable because broad territorial limits unreasonably restricted employee's employ-
ment opportunities); Crowe, 256 Ga at 240 (holding covenant unenforceable in part
because broad territorial limits protected more than just employer's training investment
in and good will from employee).
21 See notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
22 See notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
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A. The Rule of Reason
The majority of American jurisdictions follow some variant of
the "rule of reason" in determining the enforceability of
noncompete covenants.23 This rule holds that:
A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a
restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transac-
tion or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade
if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect
the promisee's legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee's
need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and
the likely injury to the public."14
23 See Bell Fuel Corp. v Cattolico, 375 Pa Super 238, 250-51, 544 A2d 450 (1988) (cit-
ing Pennsylvania's three-part test), appeal denied, 520 Pa 612, 554 A2d 505 (1989); Phone
Connection, Inc. v Harbst, 494 NW2d 445, 449 (Iowa App 1992) (citing Iowa's three-part
test); Firearms Training Systems, Inc. v Sharp, 213 Ga App 566, 567, 445 SE2d 538
(1994) (citing Georgia's three-part test); Fine Foods, Inc. v Dahlin, 147 Vt 599, 603, 523
A2d 1228 (1986) (citing Vermont's three-part test); McCann Surveyors, Inc. v Evans, 611
A2d 1, 3-4 (Del Ch 1987) (citing Delaware's multi-part test); Technicolor, Inc. v Traeger,
57 Hawaii 113, 122, 551 P2d 163 (1976) (citing Hawaii's three-part test); Wolf v Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 309 SC 100, 107-09, 420 SE2d 217 (SC App 1992) (citing South
Carolina's five-part test); Dynamic Air, Inc. v Bloch, 502 NW2d 796, 799 (Minn App 1993)
(citing Minnesota's multi-factor test); American Building Serv., Inc. v Cohen, 78 Ohio App
3d 29, 33, 603 NE2d 432 (1992) (citing Ohio's three-part test); All Stainless, Inc. v Colby,
364 Mass 773, 778, 308 NE2d 481 (1974) (citing Massachusetts's three-part test);
Ferrofluidics Corp. v Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 789 F Supp 1201, 1210 (D NH
1992) (citing New Hampshire's three-part test); Ackerman v Kimball Intl., Inc., 652 NE2d
507, 510 (Ind 1995) (citing Indiana's three-part test); Harwell Enterprises, Inc. v Heim,
276 NC 475, 478-79, 173 SE2d 316 (1970) (citing North Carolina's three-part test); Sigma
Chemical Co. v Harris, 605 F Supp 1253, 1260 (E D Mo 1985) (citing Missouri's three-part
test), afF'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 794 F2d 371 (8th Cir 1986), afid
after remand, 855 F2d 856 (8th Cir 1988); Russo Associates, Inc. v Cachina, 1995 WL
43683, *3 (Conn Super) (citing Connecticut's five-part test); Verda Indus., Inc. v Lightning
Deterrent Corp., 1995 WL 548610, *4 (N D Ill) (citing Illinois's three-part test); Holloway v
Faw, Casson & Co., 319 Md 324, 334, 572 A2d 510 (1990) (citing Maryland's three-part
test); Brockley v Lozier Corp., 241 Neb 449, 459-60, 488 NW2d 556 (1992) (citing
Nebraska's three-part test); Apollo Technologies Corp. v Centrosphere Industry Corp., 805
F Supp 1157, 1192 (D NJ 1992) (citing New York's three-part test); Comprehensive Tech-
nologies Intl., Inc. v Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F3d 730, 738 (4th Cir 1993) (citing
Virginia's three-part test), vacated and case dismissed pursuant to settlement, 1993 US
App LEXIS 28601 (4th Cir); AmeriGas Propane, Inc. v Crook, 844 F Supp 379, 385 (M D
Tenn 1993) (citing Tennessee's three-part test); Carnahan v Alexander Proudfoot Co.
World Headquarters, 581 S2d 184, 185 (Fla App 1991) (enforcing Florida statute through
three-part test); Zep Manufacturing Co. v Harthcock, 824 SW2d 654, 660 (Tex App 1992)
(enforcing Texas statute through two-part test); Hillis v Waukesha Title Co., 576 F Supp
1103, 1106 (E D Wis 1983) (enforcing Wisconsin statute through five-part test); Nation-
wide Mutual Ins. Co. v Cornutt, 907 F2d 1085, 1087 (11th Cir 1990) (enforcing Alabama
statute through four-part test); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 445.774a (West 1989) (codifying
Michigan's three-part test).
24 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188(1) (1979).
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The restraint is unreasonable if it is more extensive in duration,
geographical area, or type of activity than necessary to protect
the employer's interests.25 Legitimate employer interests include
the protection of trade secrets, customer lists, and investments
such as training in unique skills.2" Even if a covenant contains
unreasonable provisions, some jurisdictions are willing to enforce
the reasonable portions or modify the unreasonable ones.27 Oth-
er jurisdictions do not permit courts to enforce any portion of a
covenant containing unreasonable provisions.28
1. The traditional conception of a reasonable geographic
limit.
The traditional definition of a reasonable geographic limit in
a noncompete covenant is the area in which the former employee
did business on behalf of the employer." The entire area of the
employer's business is an unreasonably broad limit unless the
employer can show a legitimate interest in such a broad protec-
tion.3" If the former employee is in a position to compete unfair-
ly in the employer's entire market, courts will enforce a geo-
graphic limit broader than the area in which the employee did
business for the employer."
25 Id § 188 comment d.
26 Apollo Technologies Corp., 805 F Supp at 1192-93; Picker Intl., Inc. v Parten, 935
F2d 257, 262 (11th Cir 1991); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v Altech, Inc., 765 F Supp 1310,
1336 (N D 111 1990).
27 See JAK Productions, Inc. v Wiza, 986 F2d 1080, 1087 (7th Cir 1993) (describing
"blue pencil" doctrine, under which courts disregard unreasonable portions and enforce
only reasonable portions of covenants not to compete); Holloway, 319 Md at 329-30
(describing rule of partial enforcement and upholding lower court's reduction of covenant's
duration from five to three years).
See Wis Stat Ann § 103.465 (West 1988).
See America Software USA, Inc. v Moore, 264 Ga 480, 481-82, 448 SE2d 206
(1994); Ackerman, 652 NE2d at 510; Diversified Human Resources Group, Inc. v Levinson-
Polakoff, 752 SW2d 8, 12 (Tex App 1988); Chuck Wagon Catering, Inc. v Raduege, 88 Wis
2d 740, 754, 277 NW2d 787 (1979); Zep Manufacturing Co., 824 SW2d at 660; Donahue v
Permacel Tape Corp., 234 Ind 398, 406-07, 127 NE2d 235 (1955); Crowe v Manpower
Temporary Serv., 256 Ga 239, 240, 347 SE2d 560 (1986).
' See America Software USA, Inc., 264 Ga at 481-82; Ackerman, 652 NE2d at 510;
Diversified Human Resources Group, Inc., 752 SW2d at 12; Chuck Wagon Catering, Inc.,
88 Wis 2d at 754; Zep Manufacturing Co., 824 SW2d at 660; Donahue, 234 Ind at 406-07;
Crowe, 256 Ga at 240.
" See note 35 and accompanying text. See also Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin,
Inc. v Hamilton, 101 Wis 2d 460, 466-68, 304 NW2d 752 (1981) (rejecting flat rule that
would invalidate all covenants with broader scope than former employee's actual territo-
ry).
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For example, in Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v
Hamilton,2 the court noted, "[in the case of] route salesmen or
other non-management employees, the scope of actual customer
contact may serve as a guide to what scope of restriction is rea-
sonable. [citations omitted] But the customer contact notion takes
on a new dimension where the person involved is a high-level
management employee who is apt to have access to confidential
business information."
33
Similarly, in Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v Donahey,4 the
court upheld a nationwide restriction even though the employee
had worked primarily in one area of the country.35 The court's
rationale was that the employee's use of the employer's highly
specialized statistical information "anywhere in the country could
seriously injure [the employer's] business."36
In contrast, some jurisdictions have found the broader area
of where the employer did business to be a reasonable limit sole-
ly because the employer had a market in the broader area and
not because the- employee had a special competitive position. 7
For example, the court in Kramer v Robec, Inc. 3' reasoned,
"[s]ince competition in the computer market is world-wide and
since Robec distributes throughout the nation and overseas, the
geographic extent of the covenant-the United States-is reason-
able."39
101 Wis 2d 460, 304 NW2d 752 (1981).
Id at 469 (citing to Chuck Wagon Catering, Inc., 88 Wis 2d 740; Lakeside Oil Co. v
Slutsky, 8 Wis 2d 157, 98 NW2d 415 (1959); Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v Lueth, 213 Wis
42, 250 NW 819 (1933); Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v Ring, 210 Wis 467, 246 NW 567
(1933); Eureka Laundry Co. v Long, 146 Wis 205, 131 NW 412 (1911)).
281 S2d 239 (Fla App 1973).
" Id at 242. See also Hulsenbusch v Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F2d 730, 736 (8th Cir
1965) (holding that irreparable injury to employer's competitive advantage in national
market made nationwide restriction reasonable).
' Auto Club Affiliates, Inc., 281 S2d at 242. See also Hulsenbusch, 344 F2d at 736.
31 See note 39 and accompanying text.
824 F Supp 508 (E D Pa 1992).
Id at 512. See also Matlock v Data Processing Security, Inc., 618 SW2d 327, 329
(Tex 1981) (noting that "[t]he breadth of territorial restrictions in noncompetition cove-
nants may vary with the nature and extent of the employer's business operations" and
holding a nationwide noncompete covenant unenforceable because the employer did not
have nationwide market); Comprehensive Technologies Intl., Inc., 3 F3d at 739-40 (holding
that nothing less than nationwide prohibition could protect interests of employer with
national market); Marshall v Gore, 506 S2d 91, 91-92 (Fla App 1987) (holding that evi-
dence of employer sales to Pennsylvania, Iowa, Wisconsin, Ohio, Vermont, Missouri, and
Oregon as well as nationwide advertisements justified nationwide restraint); Harwell
Enterprises, Inc., 276 NC at 480-81 (holding that allegations of employer's nationwide
business activities were sufficient to support reasonableness of nationwide limitation).
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Some courts determine the reasonableness of a covenant's
time and geographical limits in tandem, allowing one to be
broader if the other is narrower.' ° For example, in Russo Asso-
ciates, Inc. v Cachina,4 ' the court noted that the two limits were
to be considered in relation to each other.2 It held that the two-
year covenant at issue was unenforceable as too long because the
"expanse of the geographic area distinguishes this case from
other cases in which courts have found a two year restriction to
be valid."' Similarly, measuring both duration and territory by
the nature of the employer's market, the Kramer court held a
nationwide geographic restraint reasonable but reduced its time
period from three to two years "because of the quick pace of obso-
lescence and technological innovation.""
2. The reasonable geographic limit in national and interna-
tional markets.
The traditional models of what constitutes a "reasonable
geographic area" do not fit telecommuting relationships in the
context of a worldwide or nationwide geographical market be-
cause the relationships have no relevant geographical place. Both
the broader rule examining the area of the employer's business
and the narrower rule examining the area in which the employee
actually performed services for the employer have no meaning in
telecommuting relationships because the physical location, if any,
of the employer's operations and the employee's services bear
little relation to that of the employer's customers. Since
telecommuting relationships in nationwide and worldwide mar-
kets have no "place," courts must treat them as having either no
geographical location or a worldwide geographic location under
existing doctrine. Under either treatment, the most analogous
cases are those involving nationwide or worldwide markets,
where geographic limits have little relevance in reasonableness
determinations. An analysis of such broad-market cases follows.
Employers with nationwide or worldwide markets have pro-
tected themselves by circumventing the reasonable geographic
requirement in noncompete agreements." Many courts, there-
o See notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
41 1995 WL 43683 (Conn Super).
412 Id at *3-4.
SId at *4.
Kramer, 824 F Supp at 512.
See, for example, MedX Inc. v Ranger, 780 F Supp 398, 403 (E D La 1991) (noting
that noncompete covenant with employee was silent as to geographical scope); Cad Cam,
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fore, have modified their traditional conception of a reasonable
geographic area to create a legal rule for noncompete covenants
with nationwide, worldwide, or no geographic limits."6 Some
courts have relaxed the territorial requirement, while others
have adhered to it.
47
The latter have held that covenants not to compete which
have no effective geographic limit are per se unreasonable. 8 For
example, the court in Tamburo v Calvin9 held that a covenant
failing to specify territorial or temporal limits was "too vague to
be enforced" as a matter of law. ° Interpreting, the reasonable
geographic area requirement under the Texas statute on cove-
nants not to compete,5' the court in Zep Manufacturing Co. v
Harthcock52 held that "[t]he noncompete covenant in this case
contained no limitation as to geographical area. Thus, the
noncompete covenant does not comply with [the statute]."53
Many jurisdictions, however, take a looser approach to cove-
nants lacking a geographic limit. Their reasonableness determi-
nations take into account the interests and circumstances in-
volved." A common consideration is the employer's interest in
its client base.55 One court noted that as the employer defines
its protected customer base more narrowly, the need for an ex-
pressly geographic limitation decreases.58 A covenant lacking a
territorial limit is often enforceable where its purpose is to pro-
Inc. v Underwood, 36 Ohio App 3d 90, 94, 521 NE2d 498 (1987) (noting that noncompete
covenant with employee was silent as to geographical scope).
See note 57 and accompanying text.
4 See notes 49-50, 53, and 57 and accompanying text.
See notes 49-50 and 53 and accompanying text.
49 1995 WL 121539 (N D Ill) (memo).
'0 Id at *5.
" Tex Bus & Commerce Code Ann § 15.50(2) (Vernon 1987 & Supp 1996) (as amend-
ed at Tex Bus & Commerce Code Ann § 15.50 (Vernon 1987 & Supp 1996)).
52 824 SW2d 654 (Tex App 1992).
Id at 661 (emphasis in original). See also Sheline v Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 948
F2d 174, 176 (5th Cir 1991) (noting that lower court correctly held absence of territorial
limit rendered covenant unenforceable); MedX Inc., 780 F Supp at 403-04, 403-04 n 15 (re-
forming silent covenant to cover.only part of state and noting that enforcement of re-
formed covenant would not unduly burden employee and that if covenant's silence as to
geographic scope constituted worldwide scope, covenant would be manifestly unreason-
able).
See notes 57 and 62-63 and accompanying text.
5 See note 57 and accompanying text.
America Software USA, Inc. v Moore, 264 Ga 480, 481, 448 SE2d 206 (1994) (citing
W.R. Grace & Co. v Mouyal, 262 Ga 464, 467, 422 SE2d 529 (1992)). See also NCR Corp. v
Rotondi, 88 AD2d 537, 450 NYS2d 198, 199 (1982) (memo) (holding injunction of former
employee's solicitation of all present and potential customers of employer to be too broad
in absence of geographic limit).
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
tect the employer's nationwide client base because "a limitation
as to geographical location would serve no purpose." 7 Interpret-
ing the Wisconsin statute on covenants not to compete, 58 the
*court in Rollins Burdick Hunter 9 held that since "a limitation
expressed in terms of a particular group of forbidden customers
or clients is in the manner of a territorial limitation, the absence
of a geographic territorial limitation is not necessarily fatal." °
In addition to client base, activity restraints are sometimes a
factor in the reasonableness of an absence of geographical lim-
its. 1 For example, in Telxon Corp. v Hoffman,62 the court held
that a lack of geographical restrictions could be reasonable in
conjunction with appropriate activity restrictions because "the
territorial and activity scope questions often merge into a single
inquiry."3 Even though the employer had a worldwide market,
the court denied enforcement of the covenant because it con-
tained no activity restrictions" and thus would have barred the
former employee from working for any employer in any capaci-
ty.65 Taking a narrower position, the court in Ackerman v
Kimball Intl., Inc." noted that in the specific context of trade
secrets, the lack of a geographic limit did not make covenants per
se unreasonable and void.67
Beyond the debate over per se unreasonableness, the courts
disagree over whether a covenant's lack of a geographical limit
should be construed as a worldwide limit or as a limit on some
Wolf & Co. v Waldron, 51 Ill App 3d 239, 242, 366 NE2d 603 (1977). See also PCx
Corp. v Ross, 168 Il App 3d 1047, 1059, 522 NE2d 1333 (1988) (holding territorial limit
unnecessary where purpose of covenant was not to prevent competition but to protect
employer's customer relationships), affd after remand, 209 Iln App 3d 530, 568 NE2d 311
(1991); Wolf v Colonial Life, 309 SC at 109 (holding that agreement not to solicit existing
customers of employer with nationwide market was valid substitute for territorial limit);
Dynamic Air, 502 NW2d at 799-800 (holding that covenant lacking territorial limit was
not per se unreasonable because such limit is but one of several factors in determining
reasonableness and that the territorial limit is often irrelevant in non-disclosure and non-
solicitation covenants).
Wis Stat Ann § 103.465 (West 1988).
6' See note 33 and accompanying text.
6' 101 Wis 2d at 466. See also Bell Fuel, 375 Pa Super at 254-56 (holding that actual
geographic scope of non-solicitation covenant containing no explicit geographic limit was
the territory in which employers' customers were located).
61 See notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
6' 720 F Supp 657 (N D 1ll 1989).
Id at 664.
' Id.
6' Id at 665.
652 NE2d 507 (Ind 1995).
67 Id at 510.
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smaller geographic area.68 The Wolf & Co. v Waldron 9 court
held that the lack of a geographic limit did not impose a nation-
wide covenant. 70 Taking a different approach, the court in Hillis
v Waukesha Title Co. 7' held that the particular circumstances of
a covenant, such as the type of business and the location where
competition occurs in the business, inform the meaning of a cove-
nant lacking a geographical limit.72 In contrast, the court in Sig-
ma Chemical Co. v Harris7 held that a covenant's silence as to
territory "effectively prohibits defendants from working for a
competitor for two (2) years anywhere in the world."74 On ap-
peal, the Eighth Circuit expressly declined to decide whether
silence rendered the whole covenant void and did not address the
lower court's holding that the effective worldwide restriction was
reasonable because the employer's market was worldwide.75
Even when courts find that a covenant has worldwide scope,
its reasonableness is another point of contention among jurisdic-
tions. The North Carolina Supreme Court has implied that it
would find a worldwide covenant reasonable if the employer had
a worldwide market because "the new products and techniques
constantly being developed, the nation-wide activities (even
world-wide in some instances) of many business enterprises, and
the resulting competition on a very broad front" are increasing
the need for broad employer protections.76 Conversely, Verda
Industries, Inc. v Lightning Deterrent Corp.7v  noted, "a
noncompetition clause that precludes competition anywhere in
See notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
'9 51 Ill App 3d 239, 366 NE2d 603 (1977).
70 Id at 242. See also Verda Indus., 1995 WL 548610 at *4-5 (declining to infer world-
wide scope from absence of territorial limit in a distributorship contract's noncompete
covenant).
71 576 F Supp 1103 (E D Wis 1983).
72 Id at 1106.
7' 605 F Supp 1253 (E D Mo 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
794 F2d 371 (8th Cir 1986), affd after remand, 855 F2d 856 (8th Cir 1988).
71 Id at 1260. See also American Hot Rod Association, Inc. v Carrier, 500 F2d 1269,
1278-79 (4th Cir 1974) (holding covenant's lack of territorial restriction to be a worldwide
prohibition); Ferrofluidics Corp. v Advanced Vacuum Components, 789 F Supp 1201, 1209-
11 (D NH 1992) (holding covenant's lack of territorial limit to constitute nationwide
prohibition where employer had nationwide market), afl'd, 968 F2d 1463 (1st Cir 1992).
71 Sigma Chemical Co., 794 F2d at 374.
71 Harwell Enterprises, 276 NC at 480-81. See also Sigma Chemical Co., 605 F Supp
at 1260 (holding that effective worldwide restriction was reasonable because employer's
market was worldwide); Firearms Training Systems, 213 Ga App at 567-68 (holding that
worldwide covenant was unreasonable only because employee's duties were limited to na-
tional segment of employer's worldwide market).
71 1995 WL 548610 (N D Ill).
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the world is unlikely to be deemed reasonable in geographic
scope."78 The court also implied that if it could infer unlimited
geographical scope from a covenant's failure to define its territo-
rial limits, it would hold the covenant per se unreasonable.79
B. Legislation on Covenants Not to Compete
A minority of states have legislation on the enforceability of
restrictive covenants."s The statutes that permit noncompete
covenants generally prescribe some variant of the common-law
test. For example, a Florida law allows noncompete agreements
"within a reasonably limited time and area"8 and permits in-
junctive relief if the covenant is reasonable, consistent with the
public welfare, and the employer demonstrates irreparable inju-
ry." Both Michigan and Texas expressly authorize judicial modi-
fication of unreasonable covenants. 3 In contrast, Wisconsin ex-
pressly forbids the enforcement of any part of a noncompete cove-
nant that contains an unreasonable provision.'
On the other hand, some states allowing noncompete cove-
nants have narrowed the common-law rule. For example, Colora-
do renders all such covenants void unless they are contracts for
the purchase of a business, contracts for the protection of trade
secrets, provisions for the recovery of training expenses, or con-
tracts involving executive or management personnel and their
professional staff.8" In the category of training expense recovery,
the employee must have served the employer for less than two
years.8 In South Dakota, noncompete covenants in the employ-
ment context are valid only "for any period not exceeding two
78 Id at *4.
7' Id at *4-5.
" See P. Jerome Richey, ed, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey 1, 17,
24, 38, 50, 68, 80, 95, 104, 118, 138, 164, 170, 179, 206, 220, 231, 244, 252, 269, 281, 296,
309, 319, 333, 340, 349, 358, 371, 386, 394, 407, 415, 441, 456, 461, 485, 495, 507, 523,
531, 543, 552, 561, 578, 588, 596, 612, 622, 637, 649 (BNA, 1991); Arnold H. Pedowitz and
Robert W. Sikkel, eds, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey 82, 102, 105,
106, 112, 128, 130, 138, 150, 151, 176, 204, 206, 207, 239, 252, 255, 259, 260, 275, 276,
284, 291, 292, 297, 303, 325, 334, 342, 343, 352, 359, 360, 379, 392, 397, 411, 413, 414,
433, 436, 447, 451, 460, 495, 500, 501, 505, 509, 512, 522 (BNA, Supp 1996).
81 Fla Stat Ann § 542.33(2)(a) (West 1988 & Supp 1996).
82 Id.
' Mich Comp Laws Ann § 445.774a (West 1989); Tex Bus & Commerce Code Ann
§§ 15.50 to 15.52 (Vernon 1987 & Supp 1996).
Wis Stat Ann § 103.465 (West 1988).
1986 Colo Rev Stat § 8-2-113.
Id.
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years."7 Similarly, Louisiana restricts the time period of
noncompete covenants in employment relationships to two years
after termination.88 Hawaii protects employees and former em-
ployees by awarding them reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if
they prevail in any civil suit "which involves the interpretation or
enforcement" of a noncompete covenant. 9
A few states prohibit noncompete covenants in employment
contracts. California, Montana, and North Dakota void covenants
that restrain anyone from engaging in a lawful profession, trade,
or business. All three states also provide exceptions for sellers
of the goodwill of a business and partners in anticipation of or
upon dissolution of a partnership, but even those noncompete
agreements must be within specified cities or counties."
Some states ban noncompete covenants only in specific pro-
fessions. Delaware invalidates noncompete agreements between
physicians which restrict physicians' rights to practice medicine
but permits enforcement of any damages provisions." In Ver-
mont, schools of cosmetology may not condition training on
agreement to enter a covenant not to compete.93
III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT OF
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE FOR TELECOMMUTING
RELATIONSHIPS
Both traditional and current doctrines on the enforceability
of noncompete covenants fail to provide a satisfactory substitute
for the reasonable geographic limit in telecommuting relation-
ships. Courts urgently need to find a substitute because world-
wide covenants appear reasonably necessary to protect employer
interests in geographically expanding markets. ' The doctrinal
accommodations in the rule of reason for the growth of national
'7 SD Cod Laws § 53-9-11 (1990).
La Rev Stat Ann § 23:921C (West 1985 & Supp 1996).
Hawaii Rev Stat § 607-14.9 (1985 & Supp 1992).
'o Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16600 (West 1987); Mont Code Ann § 28-2-703 (1995); ND
Cent Code § 9-08-06 (1987).
" Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16601-16602 (West 1987); Mont Code Ann § 28-2-704 to 28-
2-705 (1995); ND Cent Code § 9-08-06 (1987).
6 Del Code Ann § 2707 (1993).
" 26 Vt Stat Ann § 674 (Equity 1989 & Supp 1995).
See Harwell Enterprises, Inc. v Heim, 276 NC 475, 480-81, 173 SE2d 316 (1970)
(noting that nationwide covenants appear reasonable to protect nationwide activities of
employers and implying that worldwide activities of employers would require worldwide
protection).
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and international markets do not create a fair or coherent stan-
dard for all telecommuting relationships.
These doctrinal accommodations for national and interna-
tional businesses establish viable enforcement rules for
telecommuting noncompete covenants designed to protect trade
secrets or customer lists." However, where the employer seeks
to protect only its investment in training, courts have not provid-
ed a substitute employee protection for reasonable geographic
limits.
For instance, a telecommuting employee of a highly special-
ized, worldwide consulting firm might have equal amounts of
contact with all the major clients in the industry because most of
the clients large enough to demand such specialized service pa-
tronize most of the firms in the industry. Any customer-specific
or activity-specific limit would have the effect of barring the em-
ployee from his or her consulting specialty and therefore would
not be an adequate substitute for a reasonable geographic limit.
A geographic limit would also unduly burden the employee be-
cause only a worldwide geographic limit would be sufficient to
protect the employer's training investment. If the covenant is
then unenforceable because all options under existing law would
unduly burden the employee," the employer's interest goes un-
protected. 7
" See Wolf & Co. v Waldron, 51 Ill App 3d 239, 242, 366 NE2d 603 (1977) (holding
that territorial limit serves no purpose where employer interest is nationwide client base);
PCx Corp. v Ross, 168 Ill App 3d 1047, 1059, 522 NE2d 1333 (1988) (holding territorial
limit unnecessary where purpose of covenant was not to prevent competition but to
protect employer's customer relationships), affld after remand, 209 Ill App 3d 530, 568
NE2d 311 (1991); Wolf v Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 309 SC 100, 109, 420 SE2d 217
(SC App 1992) (holding that agreement not to solicit existing customers of employer with
nationwide market was valid substitute for territorial limit); Dynamic Air, Inc. v Bloch,
502 NW2d 796, 799-800 (Minn App 1993) (holding that covenant lacking territorial limit
was not per se unreasonable because such limit, while important, is only one of several
factors in determining reasonableness).
See Firearms Training Systems, Inc. v Sharp, 213 Ga App 566, 568, 445 SE2d 538
(1994) (holding unenforceable a worldwide restriction on all activity of employee within
industry because it substantially limited his right to earn a living).
" Some of the expertise the employer transferred to the employee might be
protectable under agency law, but the remainder of the employer's investment would go
unprotected. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 395-96 (1957). An agent has a fidu-
ciary duty to his or her principal, even post-termination, not to use or disclose trade
secrets, customer lists, or other confidential information. Id at § 395 comment b and
§ 396(b). The duty does not extend to special skills an employee acquires from employ-
ment. Id at § 395 comment b. This Comment will not address trade secret or agency law.
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The employer's interest is not trivial, as evidenced by ISC-
Bunker Ramo Corp. v Altech, Inc.," in which the defendant sys-
tematically hired the plaintiffs technicians who had completed
the plaintiff's extensive training program.9 Thus, the defendant
avoided providing the specialized training employees needed to
enter the industry.'00 The court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion against the defendant's hiring practices because the defen-
dant induced the plaintiffs employees to breach their noncompete
contracts, which protected the plaintiffs interest in its training
investment. 101
The decisions in analogous cases do not provide guidance for
how courts should balance the employer's investment in training
against the employee's need to pursue employment elsewhere in
the telecommunications context. In Telxon Corp. v Hoffman,"°
the employer competed in a worldwide market against five to six
major competitors for customers. The customers often switched
vendors for lower prices.0 3 The employee left to work for one of
the major competitors despite a noncompete agreement of world-
wide scope that lacked activity limits." The court refused to
enforce the covenant because narrower geographic limits would
have protected the employer and because the worldwide prohibi-
tion on unlimited activity was unduly harsh.0 5 The stated goal
of the decision was "to encourage employers to write contracts
more narrowly tailored to serve their own individual needs.""°
However, if the employment relationship in Telxon was a
telecommuting relationship, and if the employee served the
employer's whole worldwide market rather than just the Ameri-
can segment, the employer would not have been able to tailor the
contract along narrower geographical lines.
In addition, even though the court faulted the covenant be-
cause "the relevant clauses [did] not preclude employment only in
those capacities which might threaten Telxon's legitimate inter-
ests," 7 any adequate activity limit from Telxon's point of view
would have excluded the employee from the whole market. In
" 765 F Supp 1310 (N D Ill 1990).
Id at 1327.
100 Id.
101 Id at 1335-36, 1340.
' 720 F Supp 657 (N D 11 1989).
'o Id at 658-59.
104 Id at 658, 664-65.
10 Id at 658, 664-66.
' Telxon, 720 F Supp at 666.
107 Id at 664.
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other words, the court's objection was that "the agreement would
[have] prevent[ed] Hoffman from working as a competitor's jani-
tor," °8 but Hoffman most likely did not want to be a
competitor's janitor. Narrowing the agreement to allow Hoffman
to take nonthreatening positions still would have excluded him
from the whole market, while narrowing the agreement to allow
Hoffman to take some threatening positions would not have pro-
tected the employer.
In Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v Donahey, °9 the employer's
highly specialized business of automobile-racing insurance had a
limited number of customers in a nationwide market." ° The
employee in this case also had access to unique business informa-
tion that would have given him an unfair competitive advantage
anywhere in the nation."' The court held the nationwide
noncompete covenant reasonable only because the employee was
the first to suggest the covenant and therefore could not claim it
was oppressive."' This fact-specific solution is not likely to be
applicable to even a majority of telecommuting relationships in
such markets, where customer-specific limits would operate as a
complete bar from the industry.
Equally unhelpful is Sigma Chemical Co. v Harris,"' in
which the employee's former and current employers were top
competitors in a worldwide market."4 The Eighth Circuit up-
held the lower court's injunction prohibiting the employee from
working for the particular competitor but declined to address the
lower court's finding that the covenant's lack of geographical
limits constituted a reasonable worldwide restriction."5 This
decision produces an unsatisfactory rule for future covenants. If
employers have to relitigate the enforcement of noncompete
agreements with respect to every one of their competitors who is
willing to employ their former employees, the result will be ei-
ther an expensive exclusion of the employee from the industry or
the effective nonenforcement of the covenant.
In some telecommuting relationships that involve nationwide
or worldwide markets, defining a reasonable geographic area as
,0 Id at 664-65.
109 281 S2d 239 (Fla App 1973).
110 Id at 242.
1 Id.
112 Id at 244.
"' 794 F2d 371 (8th Cir 1986), afrd after remand, 855 F2d 856 (8th Cir 1988).
14 Id at 373.
Id at 374.
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worldwide or unlimited appears to be necessary to protect em-
ployers from the unfair competition of former employees who had
access to unique business information and training.116 Several
factors, however, make worldwide or unlimited covenants an
unsatisfactory solution under existing law. First, courts disagree
on whether a worldwide covenant could be reasonable." 7 Sec-
ond, although courts are more likely to enforce an unlimited
covenant, or one that is silent with respect to geographic limits,
than an explicitly worldwide covenant, courts still disagree on
whether and under what circumstances such covenants are rea-
sonable."' Most courts base their enforcement of silent, unlim-
ited covenants on facts that do not apply to telecommuting rela-
tionships."'
Third, the employee will almost always suffer undue hard-
ship under worldwide or unlimited covenants. 2 ' As the court in
Russo Associates, Inc. v Cachina"' noted about one industry,
but which is true of many highly specialized markets, "the com-
puter field changes rapidly and [] a two year hiatus from working
in the C[omputer] A[ssisted] D[esign] field would exclude
Cachina from the developments in the field. If the covenant were
enforced, Cachina would be extremely disadvantaged when he
reentered the [market]."22 Worldwide or unlimited covenants
would force employees out of their chosen professional special-
ty. 2 Even employees who possess some transferable skills do
not necessarily have the means to develop a new specialty. Final-
ly, the public has an arguable interest in the continued
... See note 94 and accompanying text.
"7 See Harwell Enterprises, 276 NC at 480-81; Sigma Chemical Co. v Harris, 605 F
Supp 1253, 1260 (E D Mo 1985), afrd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 794 F2d
371 (8th Cir 1986), afrd after remand, 855 F2d 856 (8th Cir 1988). Compare notes 77-79
and accompanying text.
.. See notes 54-67 and 119 and accompanying text.
"9 See PCx Corp. v Ross, 168 Ill App 3d 1047, 1059, 522 NE2d 1333 (1988) (holding
territorial limit unnecessary where purpose of covenant was not to prevent competition
but to protect employer's customer relationships), aff d after remand, 209 Ill App 3d 530,
568 NE2d 311 (1991); Hillis v Waukesha Title Co., 576 F Supp 1103, 1106 (E D Wis 1983)
(holding that since competition in the title insurance industry occurs at the county level,
the local market should inform the meaning of a covenant lacking geographical limits).
120 See notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
121 1995 WL 43683 (Conn Super).
122 Id at *4.
123 See Firearms Training Systems, 213 Ga App at 568 (holding unenforceable a
worldwide restriction on all activity of employee within industry because it substantially
limited his right to earn a living).
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availability and mobility of telecommuting employees' servic-
es.
124
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Legislatures should fill the telecommuting gap in both cur-
rent and traditional doctrines on the enforceability of noncompete
covenants. They should decide whether employer interests war-
rant worldwide covenants and, if so, how to account for employee
and public interests. Furthermore, legislatures are better
policymakers than courts because of their access to empirical
data and their political accountability. However, until legisla-
tures choose to act, courts should apply an interim rule that uses
a time limit to balance employer, employee, and public interests.
A. The Need for Legislative Action
The question of whether worldwide or unlimited noncompete
covenants in certain telecommuting relationships are reasonable
is ultimately a policy-based, interest-balancing issue. 125 Demo-
cratically elected legislatures have superior institutional compe-
tency to courts in making policy judgments. As one commentator
observed, the judiciary has "limited ability to ascertain reliably
and with adequate generality 'legislative facts,' [] difficult[y] in
balancing competing private interests, and [I problems in sur-
mounting the limitations of the case or controversy in hand to
articulate, clearly and with sufficient determinacy, generalized
norms to guide future conduct. " 126 In Chevron, USA, Inc. v Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,127 the Supreme Court not-
ed the judiciary's lack of both expertise and political accountabil-
ity in balancing competing political interests. 128 The Court also
124 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 comment c (1979).
"' See Firearms Training Systems, Inc. v Sharp, 213 Ga App 566, 568, 445 SE2d 538
(1994) (holding unenforceable a worldwide restriction on all activity of employee within
industry because it substantially limited his right to earn a living). Compare Ferrofluidis
Corp. v Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 789 F Supp 1201, 1209-11 (D NH 1992)
(enforcing three-year covenant that prohibited all activity within employee's specialty field
and lacked geographical limits).
12 William Burnett Harvey, Private Restraint of Expressive Freedom: A Post-
Pruneyard Assessment, 69 BU L Rev 929, 965 (1989). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L J 943, 972-86 (1987) (describing
internal and external critiques of the practice of judicial balancing).
127 467 US 837 (1984).
128 Id at 865-66.
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observed that "policy arguments are more properly addressed to
legislators or administrators, not to judges."129
State legislatures should therefore provide courts with clear
and specific enforceability rules on this question because of the
need to balance employee, employer, and the public's interests.
They should perform empirical studies to ascertain factors such
as: (1) the extent to which telecommuting occurs in national and
international markets that are too homogeneous for meaningful
activity-based or customer-based restrictions on noncompete
covenants; (2) the average rate of obsolescence of job skills in
such markets; (3) the average training expenditure per new em-
ployee in such markets; and (4) the rate of decline in training
expenses over the number of years worked for a single employer
in such markets.
Some legislatures have already made this balancing judg-
ment.13 ° For instance, some states have decided that the inter-
ests of employees and the public always outweigh those interests
of employers that remain unprotected by trade secret and agency
laws. '3 These states prohibit covenants that restrain employees
from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business."2
Other states have allowed or disallowed noncompete cove-
nants only in particular circumstances. The Colorado legislature
made clear policy statements on the optimum balance of employ-
er, employee, and public interests by specifying in nongeographic
terms which employer interests are protectable through
noncompete covenants. 33 Colorado prohibits all noncompete
covenants in the employment context except those that are pur-
suant to the sale of a business, for the protection of trade secrets,
for the recovery of up to two years of new employee training
expenses, or negotiated with executive/management personnel
and their professional staff."
Similarly, Louisiana and South Dakota set specific time
limits on noncompete covenants in the employment context."5
'' Id at 864.
' See notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
'3' See note 132 and accompanying text.
12 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16600 (West 1987); Mont-Code Ann § 28-2-703 (1995); ND
Cent Code § 9-08-06 (1987).
113 1986 Colo Rev Stat § 8-2-113.
Id § 8-2-113(2Xa)-(d).
13 SD Cod Laws § 53-9-11 (1990); La Rev Stat Ann § 23:921C (West 1985 & Supp
1996).
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Both states declare void any covenant lasting longer than two
years after termination of the employment relationship.136
Delaware struck a different balance from Colorado, Louisi-
ana, and South Dakota. Only those noncompete covenants which
restrict a physician's right to practice medicine are void.137
Aside from these physician agreements, the common law remains
in effect in Delaware.13 All noncompete covenants, including
those in physicians' agreements, may carry enforceable provisions
which require payment of "damages related to competition."'39
Potential problems with the institutional competency of state
legislatures might weaken the proposal that they, and not the
courts, should decide the reasonableness of worldwide or unlimit-
ed noncompete covenants in certain telecommuting relationships.
First, many of the existing statutes merely enact some variant of
pre-existing, common-law formulations. "' Some states, howev-
er, have enacted alterations to the common law.4 Second, since
telecommuting is a rapidly growing practice, the inflexible legis-
latures may need to rely upon courts to respond to unforeseen in-
equities. On the other hand, Colorado, Louisiana, and South
Dakota demonstrate that legislatures are capable of stating
broad principles of enforcement without becoming entangled in
predicting every possible future fact pattern." In addition, leg-
islatures are in a superior position to make policy judgments in
this area because they have already begun to set telecommuting
policies.
' Id. Interestingly, before 1989 Louisiana restricted the use of employment
noncompete covenants to the recovery of substantial training or advertising expenses re-
lated to the employee. See Diesel Driving Academy, Inc. v Ferrier, 563 S2d 898, 903 (La
App 1990), recalled in part and reinstated in part on reh'g on other grounds, 1990 La App
LEXIS 1902 (La App) (per curiam).
... See 6 Del Code Ann § 2707 (1983); P. Jerome Richey, ed, Covenants Not to Com-
pete: A State-by-State Survey 95 (BNA, 1991); Arnold H. Pedowitz and Robert W. Sikkel,
eds, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey 138 (BNA, Supp 1996).
' Id.
1 6 Del Code Ann § 2707 (1993).
',o See Fla Stat Ann § 542.33 (West 1988 & Supp 1996); Mich Comp Laws Ann
§ 445.774a (West 1989); Tex Bus & Commerce Code Ann §§ 15.50 to 15.52 (Vernon 1987
& Supp 1996); Wis Stat Ann § 103.465 (West 1988).
141 See 1986 Colo Rev Stat § 8-2-113; Ala Code § 8-1-1 (1993); SD Cod Laws §§ 53-9-8
to 53-9-11 (1990).
142 See 1986 Colo Rev Stat § 8-2-113; La Rev Stat Ann § 23:921C (West 1985 & Supp
1996); SD Cod Laws §§ 53-9-8 to 53-9-11 (1990).
"4 See Alice Bredin, Home, Sweet Home, Newsday 31, 32 (Sept 13, 1993) (describing
legislative initiatives requiring the development of telecommuting programs); Cal Govt
Code §§ 14200, 14200.1, 14201 (West 1992 & Supp 1996).
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B. An Interim Rule for Courts
Until legislatures address the reasonableness of worldwide
covenants in telecommuting relationships, courts should apply an
interim rule. Specifically, in cases where a nationwide or world-
wide telecommuting market is too homogeneous for meaningful
activity or customer limits on noncompete agreements, courts
should balance the competing interests with a specific time limit
on the enforceability of covenants. Courts should set a specific
time limit for each industry or market based on factors such as
the average rate of obsolescence of job skills in the market and
the average rate of decline in training expenses over the number
of years worked for a single employer.
Current doctrine fails to provide a rule for balancing compet-
ing interests. If the employer needs to recover a material training
investment, only a nationwide or worldwide covenant can protect
its interest. The employee's interest in earning a livelihood, how-
ever, calls for retention of some employment opportunities. In
addition, the public has an interest in the continued availability
of the employee's services.
In the past, courts have balanced competing interests by
setting specific time limits on the practice in question.1" For
example, in the area of property, the common law produced two
time-limit doctrines, the rule against perpetuities and the pre-
scriptive creation of servitudes.'" The rule against perpetuities
invalidates future interests in property which may not vest, if at
all, within twenty-one years of some life in being at the creation
of the interest." The judiciary created the rule against perpe-
tuities in order to balance the donor's interest in controlling the
future use of her/his property, the donee's interest in free and full
use of the property, and society's interest in the free alienation of
property.
147
The common law also developed the doctrine of prescription,
which permitted the creation of servitudes through use for a
'" See notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
145 See Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) at div I, pt I, intro note
(1981) (describing adoption by American courts of the common law's rule against perpetu-
ities); Restatement (First) of Property at div III, pt II, ch 15, intro note (1936) (describing
common-law origin of prescriptive easements); Restatement (Third) of Property
(Servitudes) § 2.16 comments a, b, c (T D No 3 1993) (describing American acceptance and
gradual rejection of prescription).
' Fleet Natl. Bank v Colt, 529 A2d 122, 129 (RI 1987).
Id; Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) at div I, pt I, intro note
(1981).
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twenty-year period."4 Although American courts generally have
substituted statute of limitations doctrines for prescription, they
originally accepted the prescription doctrine from the English
courts.149 Prescription resulted from judicial balancing of the
owner's interest in exclusive use of her/his property, the user's
reliance interest after long use, and society's interest in conform-
ing titles to actual usage in order to protect expectations.
1 50
In the area of contracts, the common law produced the doc-
trine of incapacity due to minority, which renders all contracts
made by persons under the age of twenty-one voidable by them
regardless of their actual capacity."' The doctrine resulted from
judicial balancing of the adult party's interest in protection of its
expectations through enforcement of the agreement, the minor's
interest in protection from overreaching, and the public's inter-
ests in both the fairness and stability of transactions.'52 Most
states have lowered the age of minority to eighteen by stat-
ute.
5 3
The idea of balancing competing interests with a time-specif-
ic limit has also appeared in the current doctrine. The Kramer
court upheld a nationwide noncompete covenant but reduced its
duration from three to two years in light of the rate of obsoles-
cence in the particular market.' Legislation in Colorado,
South Dakota, and Louisiana has also used a time limit of two
years to balance employer, employee, and public interests.'55
Judicial disfavor of the "one-year provision" in the Statute of
Frauds might argue against a time-specific rule for enforcing
noncompete covenants.5 6 The one-year provision of the Statute
of Frauds'57 forbids enforcement of any contract not in writing
which "cannot be fully performed within a year from the time the
contract is made."'58 The provision originated in the 1677 Eng-
lish Statute of Frauds and is in force by statute in most Ameri-




E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Contracts § 4.3 at 377 (Little, Brown & Co. 1990).
152 Id § 4.1 at 374.
' Id § 4.3 at 377.
1 Kramer v Robec, 824 F Supp 508, 512 (E D Pa 1992).
15 See 1986 Colo Rev Stat § 8-2-113; La Rev Stat Ann § 23:921C (West 1985 & Supp
1996); SD Cod Laws § 53-9-11 (1990). See also notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
156 See notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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can jurisdictions rather than by adoption through common
law.159 Courts construe the one-year provision narrowly because
it fails to accomplish its purpose of limiting reliance on witnesses'
memories." ° The narrowing construction itself, however, is yet
another example of a judicial rule on when to apply a time-specif-
ic limit.
CONCLUSION
Employment relationships in the wake of the telecommuting
explosion challenge the assumptions underlying existing models
of the enforceability of noncompete covenants. Further complicat-
ing the problem is judicial disagreement over the definition and
relevance of a reasonable geographic limit on restrictive cove-
nants. The inquiry into whether nationwide and worldwide
noncompete covenants are reasonable is fundamentally an inter-
est-balancing question. Since legislatures are better equipped
than courts to make such policy judgments, they should provide
the courts with clear direction on the relative importance of the
employer, employee, and public interests involved.
Farnsworth, 2 Contracts § 6.1 at 83 (cited in note 151).
'8 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 130 comment a (1979).
